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Uneasy Labeling
Discon, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp., 93 F.3d 1055 (2d Cir. 1996), petition for cert.
filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3694 (U.S. Apr. 3, 1997) (No. 96-1570).
[E]asy labels do not always supply ready answers.'
In antitrust, the initial classification of a challenged business arrangement
can make or break a case. Certain types of agreements have been deemed so
patently anticompetitive that they are condemned as per se illegal. Agreements
that do not fit into per se categories are evaluated under a balancing test, the
"rule of reason." In theory, rule-of-reason analysis requires a careful
examination of the competitive impact of a specific agreement; in practice,
however, the challenged agreement is rarely struck down."
In Discon, Inc. i. NYNEX Corp.,' the Second Circuit expressed a
legitimate concern that remanding a challenge to a supplier-purchaser
agreement for adjudication under the rule of reason might allow a potentially
anticompetitive agreement to be upheld without proper scrutiny. But the court's
response-shoehorning a vertical agreement into a category of horizontal
restraints traditionally considered per se illegal--establishes a dangerous
precedent. The decision further blurs an already fuzzy line between vertical
and horizontal restraints, thereby increasing the possibility that agreements that
actually promote competition could be wrongly condemned as per se illegal.
The unnecessary expansion of the scope of a per se rule means that in future
cases, the initial classification of similar agreements could receive even greater
emphasis-and carry even higher stakes.
I. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc. 441 U S 1. 9 (1979)
2. This description is necessarily oversimplified. For a helpful-and quite influental-dtussion of
the precepts underlying rule-of-reason and per se analysis and the major cases that define the relation
between these standards, see 7 PHLLuP E. AREEDA. A\TtTRLt-' LAN% Ji 1500-1510 (1986) Professor
Areeda explicitly suggests collapsing the reasonableness-per se distinction into a single inquir) svith %arying
presumptions. See id. 1 1511; see also infra notes 23-29 and accompanying text
3. 93 F.3d 1055 (2d Cir. 1996). petatton for cert. filed. 65 U S L \V 3694 (U S Apr 3. 1997) (No
96-1570). This Case Note focuses on Discon's claims that NYNEX's actions siolated section I of the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § I (1994). It does not examine how the Second Circuit treated Diswon's
allegations that NYNEX's actions also violated section 2 of the Sherman Act. 15 U S C § 2. as \ ell as
several civil provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi.ations Act (RICO). IS U S C §
1962 (1994). See Discon, 93 F.3d at 1061-64 (affirming the district court's dismissal of most of these
claims, but reversing and remanding the district court's dismissal of Discon's conspirac)-to-monopolize
claim). Both Discon and NYNEX filed petitions for certioran On the same da) that the Supreme Court
denied Discon's petition, see Discon, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp.. 118 S. Ct 49 (1997). it requested an opinion
from the Solicitor General on issues raised in NYNEX's petition. see NYNEX Corp v Discon. Inc. 118
S. Ct. 40 (1997).
1529
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Discon, a business that removed obsolete telephone equipment, challenged
a decision by NYNEX and its wholly owned subsidiaries to purchase such
removal services from Discon's competitor, AT&T Technologies. Discon
contended that NYNEX made the arrangement with AT&T Technologies as
part of a strategy to increase its profits by exploiting its position as a regulated
monopoly.' An independent investigation by the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) found that NYNEX replicated the alleged profit-shifting
scheme in numerous contexts.' The district court, however, granted NYNEX's
motion for dismissal on the ground that the complaint failed to specify
concerted actions that amounted to an agreement.
The Second Circuit reversed, finding the meetings between NYNEX and
AT&T Technologies alleged in the complaint sufficiently probative of a
conspiracy to defeat a motion to dismiss.7 The court classified the challenged
supplier-purchaser arrangement as-in antitrust parlance--a two-party vertical
non-price agreement. 9 Such agreements are generally labeled as "exclusive
dealerships."' Exclusive dealerships are not per se illegal; they are
considered under the rule of reason (and generally upheld as reasonable),
because they can promote interbrand competition that may offset the harm they
can do to intrabrand competition." But rather than simply remanding the case
as an "exclusive dealership" controversy, the court indicated that the
4. See Discon, 93 E3d at 1058. The Second Circuit explained:
MECo, as a non-regulated affiliate of NYNEX, would purchase removal services at inflated
prices from AT&T Technologies. These removal services, along with their inflated prices, were
then passed on to NYTel, a regulated affiliate of NYNEX. In turn, NYTel was able to
overcharge its captive rate-paying customers pursuant to the rate-making process. MECo would
then recoup its inflated costs by receiving a secret year-end "rebate" from AT&T Technologies.
Id.
5. See In re New York Tel. Corp., 5 F.C.C.R. 866 (1990). Without admitting any wrongdoing,
NYNEX's subsidiary NYTel entered into a consent decree in which it agreed to refund over $35 million
to its rate-paying customers for "unreasonable rates reflecting improper capital costs and expense charges."
In re New York Tel. Corp., 5 F.C.C.R. 5892, 5893 (1990).
6. See Discon, Inc. v. NYNEX Corp., No. 90-CV-646A, 1992 WL 193683, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. June 23,
1992), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 93 F.3d 1055 (2d Cir. 1996), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W.
3694 (U.S. Apr. 3, 1997) (No. 96-1570).
7. See Discon, 93 F.3d at 1059 n.3.
8. Courts presented with a claim under section I of the Sherman Act, which outlaws unreasonable
restraints of trade, typically begin by classifying the challenged agreement according to the direction of the
agreement (horizontal, meaning between competitors, or vertical, meaning along the line of distribution)
and the nature of the agreement (price fixing, boycott, market allocation, etc.). Under the traditional model,
the "class" into which the challenged practice is placed then determines the "standard" used (per se
illegality or rule of reason). See, e.g., Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 721-24
(1988).
9. See Discon, 93 F.3d at 1059-60 & n.5 (rejecting Discon's arguments that the agreement was a
traditional horizontal restraint of trade or vertical price fixing).
10. Id. at 1060-61 (citing Business Elecs., 485 U.S. at 725-31 & n.4: Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp.,
579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1978) (en banc)).
11. See id.
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arrangement should be characterized instead as a "two-party group boycott."' 2
It then concluded that Discon had stated a cause of action "at least" under the
rule of reason and "possibly" under the per se rule applied to group boycotts
"if the restraint of trade 'has no purpose except stifling competition.""... This
is the first case in which the Second Circuit has suggested that a two-party
group boycott could be per se illegal, a change in antitrust law that may have
far-reaching implications.
II
Discon distorts modern group boycott doctrine by applying the label to
NYNEX's vertical agreement. Group boycotts generally refer to agreements
among horizontal competitors. 4 Twenty years ago, the Second Circuit held
that a two-party vertical agreement may be considered a horizontal group
boycott (though not a per se illegal boycott) if it sought to disadvantage a
competitor of one of the parties.'5 Subsequently, the Supreme Court clearly
rejected this reasoning: "[A] restraint is horizontal not because it has horizontal
effects but because it is the product of a horizontal agreement."' 6 In Discon,
the panel relied on the earlier Second Circuit precedent without addressing the
apparent contradiction. 7
Read literally, the Discon court's characterization of a group boycott as a
vertical agreement that seeks to disadvantage a horizontal competitor could
swallow up the exclusive dealership category. The court, however, emphasized
12. Id. at 1060-61. Group boycotts (also called concerted refusal! to deal) generally involve collectie
activity among a group of horizontal competitors to inhibit the competitive vitality of another competitor
The doctrine's applicability to vertical agreements stems from KIor's. Inc. v. Broadwa-Hale Stores. Inc.
359 U.S. 207 (1959), which classified an agreement among seseral manufacturer, and distributors not to
sell to a retailer as a group boycott. But KIor's specifically excluded sertical agreements that. like
NYNEX's, are made between just two parties. See id. at 212.
13. Discon, 93 F.3d at 1061 (quoting Oreck. 579 F.2d at 131 (quoting Vhite Motor Co V United
States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963))). The quotation with which the Discon court concluded highlights the
extent to which the court distorted precedent by taking it out of context. The full sentence in Oreck is
"Horizontal restraints alone have been characterized as 'naked restraints of trade with no purpose except
stifling competition'; and, therefore, per se violations of the Sherman Act." 579 F2d at 131 (citation
omitted). Oreck goes on to distinguish the vertical agreement at issue in the case from such honzontal
restraints and to hold that vertical agreements, even if classified as two-party group bo)cotts, must be
evaluated under the rule of reason. See id. The Discon court thus goes beyond Oreck in categorizing the
NYNEX agreement as potentially per se illegal. See Dtscon. 93 F.3d at 1061.
14. See supra note 12. Not all group boycotts are per se illegal, however. See infra note 27
15. See Oreck, 579 F.2d at 131-32 & n.6: see also supra note 13.
16. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp.. 485 U.S. 717. 730 n.4 (1988)
17. See Discon, 93 F.3d at 1060-61 (citing Oreck. 579 F.2d at 131-32 & n.6). Elseswhere in its opinion.
the Discon court accurately cited Business Electronics as holding that the only vertical agreements that are
per se illegal are those that fix prices. See id. at 1059 (citing Bisiness Elecs.. 485 U S at 724) Rather than
confronting directly the implications of Business Electronics. the Discon court pointed to cases from other
circuits that have treated two-party vertical agreements as honzontal group bo)cotts on ground% similar to
those used in Oreck. See id. at 1061 (citing cases). All of the cases cited from other circuits scre decided
before Business Electronics. The law in this area remains unsettled. See. e.g. James F Rill. Recent
Developments in Antitrust Enforcement, in 38Ti ANNUAL A.'mtLST LAw lSrrrtm" 685. 721-27 (PLI
Corp. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. B-988. 1997).
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that "in general" two-firm vertical agreements should be scrutinized as
exclusive dealerships and reaffirmed that in the "vast majority of cases" such
agreements have both a "pro-competitive intent and effect."' 8 Yet it did not
provide any criteria to distinguish two-party group boycotts from exclusive
dealerships. In its petition for certiorari, NYNEX seized on the court's
observation that in this case "no such pro-competitive rationale appear[ed] on
the face of the complaint,"' 9 to contend that Discon established an "entirely
unsatisfactory and unpredictable rule of law" under which a jilted supplier
could have a court strike down a perfectly reasonable supplier-purchaser
agreement simply by drafting a complaint that failed to mention a
procompetitive justification.20 Amicus briefs supporting NYNEX's petition
echoed these concerns and predicted a flood of frivolous suits.
2
'
NYNEX and the amici are partly right and partly wrong. The Discon panel
was well aware that courts must be careful when classifying complicated
arrangements. It began its analysis by noting that one of the "primary
difficulties" in antitrust law is that the initial categorization of an agreement
into the "rigid legal taxonomy" employed in cases is "often outcome-
determinative. Under one category, the arrangement may be per se illegal,
while under another, it may be found permissible under the rule of reason. 22
The Discon court's concerns about classification mirrored those generally
expressed by courts considering agreements that fall into traditionally per se
illegal categories. The Supreme Court has explained that, as with any bright
line rule, the "match between the presumed and the actual [under the per se
rule] is imperfect. 2 3 Indeed, the Court has maintained that a certain degree
of overbreadth must be "tolerated" for the sake of business certainty and
litigation efficiency.24 In recent years, however, the Court has been
increasingly forthright about the dangers of mechanistically condemning
complex agreements that literally fit within a per se illegal category. In
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (BMI),2' the
Court acknowledged that a challenged blanket licensing agreement "involve[d]
18. Discon, 93 F.3d at 1061.
19. Id. Since one does not generally expect a complaint to detail possible defenses, it is surprising that
the court suggests the absence of a procompetitive rationale to be significant,
20. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 12-13, Discon (No. 96-1570). The Second Circuit
acknowledged that some courts will be "reluctant" to apply the group-boycott rule to a two-party agreement
because such agreements "will often resemble" exclusive dealerships. Discon, 93 F.3d at 1061. Thus, as
NYNEX pointed out, the court seemed to have been "uneasily aware" that its rule might reach further than
it intended. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 12.
21. See Motion of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York for Leave To File Brief as
Amicus Curiae and Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioners at 4-5; Motion for Leave To File
Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief of Consumers Electronics Manufacturers Association as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 9-12. Practically speaking, however, truly frivolous suits would probably fail for
lack of antitrust standing or injury.
22. Discon, 93 F.3d at 1058-59.
23. Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982).
24. Id.
25. 441 U.S. I (1979).
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'price fixing' in a literal sense. -6 Yet. the Court turned the per se rule on its
head, requiring that courts take at least a quick look at possible procompetitive
justifications to determine whether a given agreement should be evaluated
under the rule of reason before classifying the agreement in a per se illegal
category.2 The label itself ceased to be determinative.
BMI recognized that classifying an agreement into a category deemed per
se illegal risks condemning an agreement that is actually procompetitive. In
Discon, the Second Circuit expressed the opposite concern, that classifying an
agreement into a category that the court (ris)identified as "'presumptively
legal" risks upholding an agreement that is actually anticompetitive.2 ' As a
matter of law, the Discon court's fears were misplaced. The rule of reason is
not a rule of per se legality; the test demands a nuanced evaluation of the
competitive pros and cons of a specific agreement. But as a purely descriptive
statement, the court's characterization of exclusive dealerships as
presumptively legal was fairly accurate. The rule of reason almost always
yields a pro-defendant outcome.29
Thus, when the Discon court was faced with an agreement that it feared
might be anticompetitive, it apparently believed that it needed to pull the
agreement out of the "exclusive dealership" category. To justify this move, it
invoked language from BMI about the dangers of over-literalness: "'[Elasy
26. Id. at 9.
27. See id. The Court explained:
As generally used in the antitrust field. "price fixing" is a shorthand %%a) of describing certain
categories of business behavior to which the per se rule has been held applicable
Literalness is overly simplistic and often overbroad Thus it is necc-,sar to characteri
the challenged conduct as falling within or N ithout that categor) of bchasijor to sklich e apply
the label "per se price fixing."
Id. Following BMI. the Supreme Court has chipped aNsay at other per se rules For esaiplc, not All literal
"group boycotts" merit per se invalidation: instead. certain characteristics should be used to identitl
collective activity where there is a considerable "likelihood o1 predominatel> anticoipetitie
consequences." Northwest Wholesale Stationers. Inc s Pacific Stationer & Printing Co. 472 L' S 2S4.
295 (1985); see also, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan. 118 S. Ct 275. 285 t 19971) tocrruling Albrrht slerahl
Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), to hold that maximum retail price ceilings ar not per se illegal. NCAA
Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85. 100-01 (1984) (declining to appl) the per se rule to a "horizontal price
fixing and output limitation" agreement because the case in'olsed an industr "'*in shiich huriontal
restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be asailable at all"). Jefferon Panh llosp Dist
No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15 (1984) (requiring that the plaintiff sho%% market posker belore fhe Court
would apply the per se rule to a tying agreement)
28. Discon, 93 F.3d at 1059 ("[W]e believe that the District Court ma% hase been misled into
categorizing the arrangement as one that is presumpti\ely legal "'1
29. For an extensive discussion of the ambiguities inherent it. and practical signiticance o.
distinguishing in dual distribution contexts between horizontal restraints that are per e illegal and '.eritcal
restraints that are evaluated under the rule of reason, see Val D Ricks & R Chet Loltts. Seeinii the
Diagonal Clearly., 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 151 (1996). The authors note that the distinction can "'make or
break" a case. Id. at 151; see also. e.g., Albert A. Foer, The Pohitcalatiaonoiic Natire oj Antttrut. 27 ST
Louis U. L.J. 331, 337-38 (1983) ("With only slight exaggeration, there is reall, onl) one thing one needs
to know about the rule of reason: when the rule is applied, the defendant ,irtuall , %%,sin. "P. Richard
A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach Re'lections on the Sl.amia De(uion,. 45 U
CHI. L. REV. 1, 14 (1977) ("[Tlhe content of the Rule of Reason is largel, unknos,,n. in practice, it is little
more than a euphemism for nonliability."). Bat see, e g.. NC.4A. 468 U S at 119-20 (tinding the challenged
agreement illegal under rule-of-reason analysis)
The Yale Law Journal
labels do not always supply ready answers."' 3 The court did not immediately
condemn the agreement as a per se illegal group boycott. Instead, following
the logic of BMI, it suggested NYNEX should have an opportunity to explain
its actions.31 While the decision is somewhat ambiguous, it seems that the
district court should apply the per se label only if NYNEX fails to prove any
procompetitive justification for its agreement with AT&T Technologies.32 The
per se rule does not do any work. The agreement is no more-and no
less-illegal if called per se illegal after a balancing test that essentially
recreates the rule of reason than if found unreasonable under the rule of reason
itself.33
Discon is dangerous because it allows a more extreme reading: Absence
of a procompetitive justification in the complaint may serve as grounds for
condemning potentially reasonable exclusive dealerships as per se illegal group
boycotts without adequate (or any) consideration of possible procompetitive
justifications. By permitting the use of a per se rule, Discon threatens to exact
overcompliance through intimidation.
III
A future decision could mitigate the potentially chilling effects of Discon
by clarifying the distinction between horizontal and vertical agreements as
applied to supplier-purchaser agreements. But the ad hoc line the court drew
between "two-party group boycotts" and "exclusive dealerships" was a
symptom of the court's concern that the rule of reason can function as a
standard of presumptive legality. Though expansion of a per se rule is not an
appropriate response, the court's fears may be well-founded. A better solution
would be a renewed commitment to-and confidence in-the careful
evaluation demanded by the rule of reason.
-Deborah A. Widiss
30. Discon, 93 F.3d at 1059 (quoting BMI, 441 U.S. at 8).
31. See id. at 1061.
32. A footnote appended to the court's last sentence in this section, however, suggested the possibility
of a presumptive use of the per se rule since "the traditional rationale for applying the rule of reason to
two-firm group boycotts--the promotion of interbrand competition over intrabrand competition-does not
exist in this case." Id. at 1061 n.6. Explicitly stating that the per se rule should be applied because of
NYNEX's monopoly power would at least circumscribe the reach of the decision. But this statement failed
to recognize that there was no interbrand competition because NYNEX was a state-sanctioned monopoly.
Since the court recognized that supplier-purchaser agreements can provide valuable efficiencies and since,
in general, state regulators should be able to ensure that such efficiencies are passed along to the consumer,
the absence of interbrand competition should not be dispositive. Cf. State Oil Co., I 18 S. C. at 280 (stating
that the proper inquiry in establishing a per se rule is "not whether [the practice] is ever illegal, but whether
it is always illegal" (quoting Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 165 (Harlan, J., dissenting))).
33. The court might have been concerned that the rule of reason would require extensive factfinding
and complicated dissection of markets. While this is often true, the Supreme Court has stated that
sometimes the rule of reason may be employed in the "'twinkling of an eye."' NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109 n.39
(quoting PHILLIP AREEDA, THE "RULE OF REASON" IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 37-38 (1981)).
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